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FOREWORD 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the 
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows . 
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout 
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic 
analysis of mission events. 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant 
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the 
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall 
Space Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the 
mIssIon. 
IV 
-------- --- - --
Photo I: Launch of S huttle Mission TS-83 
r 
I 
I 
I 
r 
I 
I 
-~---- .-~ --
1.0 SUMMARY 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 3 April 
1997. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the primary flight elements 
OV-I02 Columbia (22nd flight) , ET-84 (LWT 77), and BI-086 SRB 's. There were no significant 
vehicle or launch pad anomalies. 
The launch, originally scheduled for April 3 rd, was delayed 24 hours while insulation was added 
to a payload chilled water line. 
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 4 April 1997 from 0915 to 1040 
hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T -3 hours in the countdown. There were no Launch 
Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or TPS IPR 's 
were taken. Due to the mid-afternoon launch time and warm weather conditions, there were no 
acreage icing concerns. There were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the 
established data base. 
After the 2:20 p.m. (local) launch on 4 April 1997, a debris walk down of Pad 39A was 
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found . All the T -0 umbilicals operated 
properly. Overall, damage to the launch pad was minimal. 
A total of 109 films and videos were analyzed as part of the post mission data review. No vehicle 
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. With the 
exception of Mach diamond formation (in the order 3-1-2), SSME ignition appeared normal. A 
stud hang-up occurred on HOP #7. A shaved piece of aluminum from the bore wall fell past the 
HOP shoe shortly after T -0. No stud hang-ups or frangible nut/ordnance debris was observed on 
any of the other holddown posts with the exception of a small fragment near the HOP #5 DCS. 
Thermal curtain tape on the right SRB near HDP #4 came loose at T -0. 
OV-I02 was equipped to carry ET/ORB umbilical cameras. Four TPS divots were visible in the 
intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout in the -Y+Z quadrant outboard of the -Y bipod housing. 
The divots spanned the entire width of the closeout (9-11 inch diameters), but were not deep 
enough to show shadow or primed substrate. Three more TPS divots were detected in the 
intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout between the bipods. Two of the divots were located close 
to centerline /+Z axis while the third divot appeared to be in the general area of the -Y bipod 
standoff closeout. These three divots were approximately 6-7 inches in diameter and shallow. 
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after retrieval. Both frustums were in 
excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds were detected over fasteners or 
acreage. All eight BSM aero heat shield covers appeared to be locked in the fully opened position, 
though all four cover attach rings on the right frustum had been bent by parachute riser 
entanglement. The upper right cover was missing. Signs of a stud hang-up were evident on the 
HOP #7 foot with broaching of the bore wall. Stud thread impressions were also present in the 
wall. The holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) plungers were seated and appeared 
to have functioned normally with the exception of #5, where the plunger was obstructed by the 
frangible nut halves. This condition may have been the result of splashdown. 
Orbiter performance as viewed on landing films and videos during final approach, touchdown, and 
rollout was nominal. Drag chute operation was also normal. 
A post landing inspection of OV-I 02 Columbia was conducted 8 April 1997 at the Kennedy 
Space Center on SLF runway 33 . The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 81 hits, of which 13 had a 
major dimension of I-inch or larger. A comparison of these numbers to statistics from 67 previous 
missions of similar configuration indicates both the total number of hits and the number of hits 
I-inch or larger were less than average. 
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The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 38 hits, of which 7 had a major dimension of I -inch 
or larger. The largest lower surface tile damage site was located on the body flap . The site 
measured 2-inches long by I-inch wide by O.I25-inch maximum depth. The damage was probably 
caused by an impact from ET/ORB umbilical ice. 
Bent metal, approximately 1-inch in length by I/4-inch wide, was visible on the trailing edge of a 
spacer between two bolt heads on the inside surface of the L02 ET door near the forward 
outboard corner. This same condition has occurred after the last three flights on different Orbiters. 
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows was typical. Damage sites on the 
window perimeter tiles appeared to be greater than usual in quantity and size. Two damage sites 
greater than I-inch in size within a cluster of 11 hits were present in the black tile area between 
windows #3 and #4. These damage sites are believed to be the result of impacts from excessive 
RTV adhesive used in attaching paper covers to the FRCS thrusters. 
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
The Debrisllce/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was conducted 
on 3 April 1997 at 1230 hours. The following personnel participated in various team activities, 
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to . reports contained in this 
document. 
1. Tatum 
G. Katnik 
1. Lin 
R. Speece 
B. Bowen 
1. Rivera 
M. Bassignani 
B. Davis 
R. Page 
M. Valdivia 
R. Seale 
1. Blue 
W. Richards 
M. Wollam 
G. Fales 
F. Foster 
B. S1. Aubin 
S. Otto 
1. Ramirez 
M. Barber 
NASA - KSC Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems 
NASA - KSC Shuttle lee/Debris Systems 
NASA - KSC Shuttle IcelDebris Systems 
NASA - KSC Thermal Protection Systems 
NASA - KSC Infrared Scanning Systems 
NASA - KSC ET Mechanisms/Structures 
NASA - KSC ET Mechanisms/Structures 
NASA - KSC Digital Imaging Systems 
NASA - KSC Level II Integration 
USA - SPC Supervisor, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems 
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems 
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems 
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems 
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems 
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems 
BNA - LSS Systems Integration 
THIO - LSS SRM Processing 
LMSO - LSS ET Processing 
LMSO - LSS ET Processing 
USA - Safety 
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3.0 LAUNCH 
STS-83 was launched at 97:094: 19:20:32.01 9 UTe (2:20 p.m. local) on 4 April 1997. 
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 3 April 
1997. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the primary flight elements 
OV-102 Columbia (22 flight) , ET-84 (LWT 77), and BI-086 SRB 's. There were no significant 
vehicle or launch pad anomalies. 
The launch was delayed 24 hours while insulation was added to a payload chilled water line. 
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION 
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 4 April 1997 from 0915 to 1040 
hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no Launch 
Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-083 03 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or TPS IPR' s 
were taken. Due to the mid-afternoon launch time and warm weather conditions, there were no 
acreage icing concerns. There were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the 
established data base. 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (ST!) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain 
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
p~rticularly those areas not visible from remote fixed scanners, and to scan for unusual 
temperature gradients. 
3.2.1 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. The F4R, R2R, and L2D RCS thruster 
covers were intact, but tinted green indicating small internal vapor leaks. Ice/frost and condensate 
had formed on SSME # 1 and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. The SSME #3 heat shjeld was 
dry. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine 
mounted heat shields. 
3.2.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
SIll case temperatures measured by the STI radiometers were close to ambient temperatures. All 
measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted 
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature supplied by THIO was 71 degrees F, which was within the 
required range of 44-86 degrees F. -
3.2.3 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a comparison to infrared 
scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate, but no ice or frost, on the ET 
acreage TP S. 
The Final Inspection Team observed no condensate, ice, or frost accumulations on the L02 tank. 
TPS surface temperatures ranged from 52-62 degrees F. 
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. lee/frost accumulation on the GUCP appeared 
less than usual. 
The Final Inspection Team observed no condensate, ice, or frost accumulations on the LH2 tank 
acreage. IPS surface temperatures averaged 52 degrees F. 
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the L02 feedline bellows and support 
brackets. 
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An 10-inch long by 114-inch wide stress relief crack had formed on the -Y vertical strut forward 
facing TPS . The presence of the crack was expected and acceptable for flight per the NSTS-
08303 criteria. 
A hairline crack was detected in the -Y thrust strut-to-tank joint TPS closeout. This condition has 
been observed on previous launches and was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
There were no TPS anomalies 'on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost accumulations were 
limited to small patches on the aft and inboard sides. Ice/frost fingers on the separation bolt 
pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical. 
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line belIows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2 
feedline bellows were wet with condensate. 
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge 
barrier outboard sides, but typical on the forward surface. Smaller than usual ice/frost fingers 
were present on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents . No unusual vapors or cryogenic 
drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
3.2.4 FACILITY 
AJI SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch. 
No leaks were observed on the GUCP or the L02 and LH2 Orbiter T -0 umbilicals. 
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Photo 2: STS-83 Ready for Launch 
OV-102 (22",1 flight) , ET-84 (LWT 77), 81-086 SRB 's 
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Photo 3: L02 Tank After Cryoload 
The Final Inspection Team ob erved no condensate. ice. or fi"ost accumulations on the L02 tank . 
TPS surface temperatures ranged from 52-62 degrees F. 
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Photo 4: LH2 Tank After Cryoload 
The Final In pection Team observed no conden ate, ice, or frost accumulations on the LH2 tank 
acreage TPS surface temperatures averaged 52 degrees F. 
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Photo 5: Overall View of SSM E's 
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Photo 6: LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical 
Le s than usual amounts of ice/fro t had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge 
barrier outboard sides, but typical on the forward ulface. Smaller than usual ice/frost fingers 
were present on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents 
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of MLP 3, Pad A FSS and RSS was conducted on 4 April 1997 from 
Launch + 1.5 to 3 hours. 
SRB Hold Down Post (HDP) erosion was typical. Boeing North America - Downey reported a 
lateral acceleration of 0.29 g ' s, which may be indicative of a stud hangup. Pad inspection showed 
no sign of a stud hang-up. However, lIDP film analysis and more detailed HDP/SRB aft skirt 
inspections verified the event. 
HOP blast covers closed properly. Epon shim material was debonded 12-inches along the 
forward, outboard edge of HOP #1 shoe, no missing material was noted. The belly band at the 
base of HDP #4 was damaged (bent outward). Aft skirt purge lines and T -0 umbilicals exhibited 
typical exhaust plume damage. 
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm and Gox Vent Arm had no visible indications 
of damage. TSM bonnets were closed. The GOX Vent seals were evaluated from the GVA hood 
access platform, no damage or residue was noted on the seals. 
The GH2 vent line was latched in the sixth of eight teeth of the latching mechanism. The ET 
GUCP had not been struck by the retract lanyard . The yoke bearing for the retract cables was 
twisted, with no damage present. 
Pad safety reported material loss and damage to the firewall in the south flame trench. Debris 
team inspection of the north flame trench showed a 2-foot by 8-inch area of missing firewall 
material from the flame deflector. Pieces of material were found on the pad apron, the mobile 
launch platform a-level and the north flame trench. 
Miscellaneous facility straps and clamps were found on the pad apron and acreage. The blast deck 
at the ECS connection tower NW of the MLP had damage. The northeast stadium light set had 
three broken covers and one broken bulb. A PA speaker horn was damaged at the FSS 135-foot 
level. An Oxidizer panel operation placard was found on the pad apron. 
Overall, damage to the pad appeared minimal. 
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5.0 FILM REVIEW 
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team, 
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. No IPR's or IF A' s were generated as a result of 
the film review. 
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 87 films and videos, which included thirty 16mm films, twenty 35mm films, and thirty-
seven videos, were reviewed starting on launch day. 
With the exception of Mach diamond formation (in the order 3-1 -2), SSME ignition appeared 
normal (OTV-051 , -070; E-19, -20, -76). Free burning hydrogen drifted up to the OMS pods. A 
flash in the SSME #2 Mach diamond during start-up may be indicative of a momentary 
contaminant in the fuel. 
Pieces of ice were shaken loose from the L02 feedline upper bellows (OTV 061). No contact 
with the lower surface tiles was observed. 
SSME ignition caused pieces of ice to fall from the ET/ORB umbilicals . Several pieces of ice 
contacted the LH2 umbilical cavity sill and were deflected outward . One piece of ice from the 
LH2 feedline bellows contacted lower surface tiles approximately fifteen feet forward of the body 
flap hinge. No tile damage was visible (OTV-009). 
Loss of tile surface coating material was again noted at the acoustic focal point on the base heat 
shield between SSME #3 and # 1 (OTV 054) . 
Tile surface coating material was lost during ignition from six places on the base heatshield 
outboard of SSME #3 (E-17), one place on the -Y side of the SSME #3 heat shield (E-20), one 
place on the aft surface of the LH ReS stinger (E-20), and two places on the aft surface of the 
RH ReS stinger (E-17). Surface coating material was also lost from several tiles on the base heat 
shield between SSME #3 and #1 at the acoustic focal point (E-19) . 
A thin, 5-inch long by I-inch wide object appeared from the base heat shield area behind SSME 
#3 and fell aft at 19 :20 :29.416 UTe. The object was more flexible than a GSE tile shim and may 
have been a tile gap filler (E-17) . 
Three small pieces of debris entered the field of view from above and fell aft at 19:20 :30.075 
UTe. The debris may have been gap fillers or RTV sealant (E-18). 
GUCP disconnect from the ET and GH2 vent line retraction was nominal (E-33, -36). 
A stud hang-up occurred on HOP #7. A shaved piece of aluminum from the bore wall fell past the 
HOP shoe shortly after T -0 (E-11). No stud hang-ups or frangible nut/ordnance debris was 
observed on any of the other holddown posts with the exception of a small fragment near the 
HDP #5 DeS (E-12) . 
Thermal curtain tape on the right SRB near HOP #4 came loose at T -0 (E-l, -5 , -7, -15). 
A flash occurred in the SSME #1 plume at T+8 seconds MET (E-52) . 
Most of the ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier material came loose and fell aft at the beginning of 
the roll maneuver 19:20:49-51 UTC (E-52, -54). 
Three debris-induced streaks occurred in the SSME exhaust plume during ascent (E-222, -223). 
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. Light-colored particles, most likely pieces of instafoam from SRB aft skirt aft rings, fell along side 
the SRB exhaust plume at T + 18 seconds and T + 67 seconds (TV-4A) . 
Typical body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was visible in film item E-212. 
Exhaust plume recirculation was also typical (E-208) . 
SRB exhaust plume recirculation appeared typicaL 
SRB separation appeared normal. Slag fell from the exhaust plumes just before, during, and after 
separation (E-208, -212, -223). 
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Photo 7: ME Mach Diamonds Formed in a 3- 1-2 Order 
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Photo 8: Tile Gap Filler 
A thin, 5-i nch long by I-inch wide object appeared from the base heat hield area behind SSME 
#3 and fell aft at 19:20:29.416 UTe. The object was more flexible than a GSE tile shim and may 
have been a tile gap filler . 
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Photo 9: H DP #7 tud Hang-Up 
A stud hang-up occurred on HOP #7. A hayed piece of aluminum from the bore wall fell past the 
HDP hoe shortly after T-O . No tud hang-up or frangible nut/ordnance debris was observed on 
any of the other holddown posts with the exception of a small fragment near the HOP #5 DC 
17 
Photo to: View from Playalinda DOAMS 
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
OV -102 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16mm motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16mm 
motion picture with lOmm lens; 35mm still views. No data was obtained from the 35mm camera 
in the L02 ET/ORB umbilical due to a film jam. Good data was obtained from both 16mm films . 
Handheld photography by the flight crew, which consisted of fifteen still 35mm images, showed a 
silhouetted tank backlit by the sun. 
SRB separation from the External Tank appeared nominal. 
ET -84 separation from the Orbiter also appeared normal. 
Five TPS divots were visible in the intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout in the -Y +Z quadrant 
outboard of the -Y bipod housing. The divots spanned the entire width of the closeout (9-11 inch 
diameters), but were not deep enough to show shadow or primed substrate. 
Three more TPS divots were detected in the intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout between the 
bipods. Two of the divots were located close to centerline I+Z axis while the third divot appeared 
to ·be in the general area of the -Y bipod standoff closeout. These three divots were approximately 
6-7 inches in diameter and shallow. 
The -YET ISRB fairing splice plate closeout was missing a shallow, 3" x 2" area of foam. 
The -Y thrust strut was missing 3-inch diameter areas of foam - one on the flange closeout and 
one just aft of the flange on the barrel. 
The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition after separation with no TPS 
damage. Frozen hydrogen adhered to the 17-inch disconnect and parts of the separation interface. 
The fire barrier on the outboard side of the LH2 umbilical exhibited two unusually large bubbles 
that were estimated to be 3" x 2" and 6" x 2" , respectively. Typically, foam had eroded from the 
horizontal (clamshell) section of the cable tray. 
Aft dome NCFI 24-57 exhibited typical charring, but less "popcorn" divoting, when compared to 
previous flights . 
5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 22 films and videos, which included nine 35mm large format films, two 16mm films, 
and eleven videos, were reviewed. 
The landing gear extended properly. The infrared scanners showed no debris falling from the 
Orbiter during final approach. Left and right main landing gear touchdown was virtually 
simultaneous at approximately 3,200 feet from the runway threshold. The Orbiter stayed close to 
the runway centerline during rollout. 
Drag chute deployment appeared nominal. 
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. Rollout and wheel stop were uneventful. 
No significant IPS damage was visible in the films . 
19 
- - - , 
Photo 11 : Normal Separation of Left SRB from ET 
Foam missing from the upper trut fa iri ng closeouts left hall ow divots 
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Photo 12: LH 2 T /ORB Umbilical 
The LH2 ET/O RB umbilical appeared to be in good condition after separation with no TPS 
damage. Frozen hydrogen adhered to the 17-inch di sconnect and palis of the eparation interface. 
The fire barri er on the outboard ide of the LH2 umbilical exhibited two unu uall y large bubbles 
that were estimated to be 3" x 2" and 6" x 2", re pectively. Typically, foam had eroded from the 
horizontal (clam hell ) section of the cable tray. 
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Photo 13: Pre-Launch View of LH2 Tanl<-to- Intertank Flange Closeout 
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Photo 14: LH2 Ta nl,-to-Inte."tank Flange Closeout Divots 
Five TPS divots were vi ible in the inteI1ank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout in the -Y+Z quadrant 
outboard of the -Y bipod housing. T he di vot panned the entire width of the closeout (9-11 inch 
diameters), but were not deep enough to how shadow or primed substrate. Th ree more TPS 
divots were detected in the intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout between the bipods. Two of the 
divots were located close to centerline I+Z axis whi le the third di vot appeared to be in the general 
area of the -Y bipod standoff closeout. These three divots were approximately 6-7 inches in 
diameter and hall ow 
6.0 SRB POST FLIGHTIRETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
The BI-086 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at CCAS 
Hangar AF on 7 April 1997. 
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds were detected 
over fasteners or acreage. None of the Hypalon paint had blistered. All eight BSM aero heat 
shield covers appeared to be locked in the fully opened position, though all four cover attach rings 
o~ t~e right frustum had been bent by parachute riser entanglement. The upper right cover was 
mlssmg. 
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS . RSS antennae covers/phenolic base 
plates were intact. The +Z antenna base plate on the right SRB exhibited two delaminated 
phenolic layers. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BT A closeouts had 
been applied. No pins or retainer clips were missing from the frustum severance rings. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing 
edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from 
severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers 
appeared undamaged from splashdown. 
TPS on the external surface of both aft skirts was intact and in good condition. Internally, less 
than usual amounts of foam were missing on the aft skirt aft rings. 
Signs of a stud hang-up were evident on the HDP #7 foot with broaching of the bore wall. Stud 
thread impressions were also present in the wall. Two to four stud thread impressions were also 
detected in the #2, #3, #5, #6, and #8 bore walls. These thread impressions may have been created 
during the stacking/tensioning process. 
The holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) plungers were seated and appeared to 
have functioned normally with the exception of #5, where the plunger was obstructed by the 
frangible nut halves. This condition may have been the result of splashdown. 
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Photo I S: Len Frust urn 
The left frustum was in excellent condition . 0 TP was missing and no debond ' w re detected 
over fastener or acreage. None of the Hypalon paint had bli tered All four B aer heat hield 
covers appeared to be locked in the fully opened p) ition 
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Photo 16: Right Frustum 
The right fru tum was in excell ent condition. No TPS was mis ing and no dcbonds were detected 
over fastener or acreage None or the Hypalon paint had bli tered 
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Photo 17: Right Fru tum BSM ' 
All fOUf '.8- M. aero heat hield covers on the right frustum appeared to be 10 ked in the fully 
opened position, though all four cover attach ring had been bent by para hut ri ser entanglement. 
The upper righ t cover was missing. 
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Photo 18: Left and Righ I FOlW a,"d Skirts 
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Photo 19: Left and Righi Aft Boosters 
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A post landing inspection of OV -102 Columbia was conducted 8- 10 April 1997 at the Kennedy 
Space Center on SLF runway 33 and in the Orbiter Processing Facility bay # 1. This inspection 
was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS 
sustained a total of 8 1 hits, of which 13 had a major dimension of 1 -inch or larger. This total does 
not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and 
exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics from 67 previous 
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23 , 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, 
which had damage from known debris sources), indicates both the total number of hits and the 
number of hits I-inch or larger were less than average (Reference Figures I and 2. Note: since no 
debris hits were recorded on both left and right sides of the Orbiter, these two figures have been 
omitted). 
The following table breaks down the STS-83 Orbiter, debris damage by area: 
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS 
Lower surface 7 38 
Upper surface 6 36 
Right side 0 0 
Left side 0 0 
Right OMS Pod 0 2 
Left OMS Pod 0 5 
TOTALS 13 81 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 38 hits, of which 7 had a major dimension of I-inch 
or larger. The largest lower surface tile damage site was located on the body flap. The site 
measured 2-inches long by I-inch wide by 0.1 25-inch maximum depth. The damage was probably 
caused by an impact from ET/ORB umbilical ice. 
Tife damage sites aft of the LH2 and L02 ET/ORB umbilicals were typical in size and quantity. 
The damage was most likely caused by impacts from umbilical ice or shredded pieces of umbilical 
purge barrier material flapping in the airstream, both of which were observed in launch films . 
No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris was identified during this inspection. 
The tires and brakes were reported to be in good condition for a landing on the KSC concrete 
runway. There was some ply undercutting on two of the MLG tires . 
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-I , EO-2, and EO-3 functioned normally. No ordnance 
fragments were found on the runway beneath the umbilical cavities. Virtually no umbilical 
closeout foam or white RTV dam material adhered to the umbilical plate near the LH2 
recirculation line disconnect. EO-2 and EO-3 retainer springs were bent. This condition has been 
observed on previous flights . 
Bent metal, approximately I-inch in length by 1/4-inch wide, was visible on the trailing edge of a 
spacer between two bolt heads on the inside surface of the L02 ET door near the forward 
outboard corner. This same condition has occurred after the last three flights on different Orbiters. 
The SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were in excellent condition. 
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Damage to base heat shield tiles, attributed to SSIvlE vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume 
recirculation, was typical. A corner was missing from a tile located in the area between SSME #2, 
SSME #3, and the body flap hinge. 
Tiles on the vertical stabilizer "stinger" and around the drag chute cavity were undamaged. 
No ice adhered to the payload bay door. 0 significant tile damage occurred on the leading edges 
of the OMS pods or vertical stabilizer. 
Hazing and streaking of forward -facing Orbiter windows was typical. Damage sites on the 
window perimeter tiles appeared to be greater than usual in quantity and size. Two damage sites 
greater than I-inch in size within a cluster of 11 hits were present in the black tile area between 
windows #3 and #4. These damage sites are believed to be the result of impacts from excessive 
R TV adhesive used in attaching paper covers to the FRCS thrusters. 
The post landing walkdown of Runway 33 was performed immediately after landing. No debris 
concerns were identified . All drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared to have functioned 
normally. 
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits I-inch or 
larger were less than average when compared to previous missions (Reference Figure 3). 
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Figure 1: Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Damage Map 
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Figure 2: Orbiter Upper Surface Debris Damage Map 
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Photo 20: Overall View Orbiter Left ide 
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Photo 21 : Overall View Orbiter Right ide 
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Photo 22: Overall View O."biter Base Heat Shield and S M 's 
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Photo 23: Orbiter Windows #3 and #4 
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows wa typical. Damag ites on the 
window perimeter tiles appeared to be greater than usual in quantity and size. Two damage site 
greater than I-inch in size wi thin a cluster of I I hit were pre ent in the black til area between 
windows #3 and #4. These damage sites are believed to be the result of impacts from exce sive 
R TV adhesive used in attaching paper covers to the FRCS thrusters 
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Photo 24: L0 2 ET/ORB Umbilica l 
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Photo 25: LH2 ET/ORB Umb ilical 
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1.0 STS-83 (OV-I02): FilmNideo Screening and Timing Summary 
1. STS-83 (OV-102): FILMIVIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING SUMMARY 
1.1 SCREENING ACTIVITIES 
1.1.1 Launch 
The STS-83 daytime launch of Columbia (OV-102) from pad A occurred on 
Friday, April 4, 1997 (day 094) at 19:20:32.029 Coordinated Universal Time 
(UTC), as seen on camera E8. Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) separation occurred at 
19:22:34.933 UTC, as seen on camera KTV13. 
On launch day, 24 of the 24 expected videos were received and screened. 
Following launch day, twenty-one films were screened. Twenty-two additional 
films were received for contingency support and anomaly resolution, but were not 
screened since there were no major launch/ascent issues . No anomalies that could 
threaten vehicle safety were seen on the launch imagery. 
Detailed Test Objective 312 was performed using umbilical well film (Method 1) 
and handheld still photography (Method 4). 
1.1.1 On-Orbit 
No on-orbit analysis support was requested. 
1.1.2 Landing 
The STS-83 flight was terminated after four days because a fuel cell exhibited an 
unacceptable internal voltage differential. Columbia landed in the afternoon on 
runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility on April 8, 1997. Eleven videos 
were received and screened. Following landing, eleven films were screened. 
Camera view SLF-North was not received. 
No anomalies were noted in the approach, landing, or roll-out video and film views 
screened. The drag chute deployment appeared normal. 
Contrails were seen trailing from the Orbiter wing tips prior to landing (Camera 
KTV6L). 
1.1.3 Post Landing 
The following items were seen on the post landing walk-around video: 
erosion/chipping of the surface area of several tiles on the base heat shield, tile 
damage on the upper surface of the body flap , a partially-dislodged piece of metal 
on the inner surface of the L02 umbilical well door, tile damage on the upper 
perimeter tiles of Orbiter forward windows 3 and 4, tile damage between windows 
3 and 4, and small abrasion marks on the main landing gear tires . 
. 
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1.0 STS-83 (OV-I02): FilmIVideo Screening and Timing Summary 
1.2 TIMING ACTIVITIES 
The time codes from videos were used to identify specific events during the initial 
screening process. 
The landing and drag chute event times are provided in Table 1.2. 
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera 
Landing Gear - Doors Opened 98: 18:32:48.633 KTV6L 
Right Main Wheel Touchdown 98: 18:33: 10.400 KTV33L 
Left Main Wheel Touchdown 98: 18:33 : 10.500 KTV33L 
Drag Chute Initiation 98: 18:33: 15.133 KTVllL 
Pilot Chute at Full Inflation 98: 18:33: 16.000 KTV33L 
Bag Release 98: 18:33: 16.667 KTVllL 
Drag Chute Inflation in Reefed 98: 18:33: 17.600 KTV33L 
Configuration 
Drag Chute Inflation in 98: 18:33:20.833 KTV33L 
Disreefed Configuration 
Nose Wheel Touchdown 98: 18:33:22.367 KTV33L 
Drag Chute Release 98: 18:33:47.800 KTV33L 
Wheel Stop 98: 18:34:09.900 KTV15L 
Table 1.2 Landing Video Event Timing 
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2.0 Summary of ignificant E 
2. UMMARY OF SIC IFI T EVE TS 
2.1 DEB RIS FROM ME IG ITIO TO LIFTOFF 
s n previ us mission " multiple pi ccs of deb ri s were seen near the lime of 
S M ignition to lino!"f (umbilica l ice debris, R S paper, RB flame duet debris) 
o da mage to the vehicle was noted . 0 fo llow-up action was requested . 
A thin, flat, irr gular-shaped pJece of debri, (possibly a paint c hip ) was seen close 
to camera 19 prior to liftoff ( 19:20:27 .659 UTC). 
Fig ure 2.1 (A) lee Dehris trik e to Umbilical Well Door ill 
Multiple pieces of ice deb ris from the LH2 ET/Orbite r umbilical were seen falling 
past the body flap during M ignition. Ice debris was seen to strike the LH2 
umbilical well door sill (19:20:27 .7 UTC). 0 damage was nored (Camera 
OTV009). 
everal li ght-colored pieces of deb ri s were seen near the L RB/ET aft attach ring 
prior to RB ignition (19:20:30.802 UTC), ( amera E31 ). 
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events 
2.2 DEBRI DURING A CE T 
During ascent, multiple pieces of debris (probably um bilical ice and R paper) 
fe ll aft of the launch vehicle after liftoff, thro ugh the roll maneuver, and beyond . 
o damage to the vehicle wa noted. 0 fo llow-up ac ti on was reque ted . 
(Camera E31 , E34, E52, E54, E76, E222, E223, E224) . 
Figure 2.2 (A) Light-Colored Debris Near RSRB 
Light-colored debris (probably umbilical ice) was seen near the RSRB aft skirt at 
19:20 :33.433 UTC (Camera OTV070). 
A loose piece of thermal curtain tape was seen on the RSRB duri ng liftoff 
(1 9:20:33.8 UTC), (Camera El , E5 , E52) . 
White debris, first een near the ET/Orbiter forw ard attach bipod, fell aft between 
the Orbiter and the ET after liftoff (19:20: 35.067 UTC). The debris was not een 
to contact the vehicle (Camera OTV061 ). 
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2.0 umma ryof ignificant Event 
Figure 2.2 (B) Debris ear RSRB Aft ET attach Ring 
Two piece of light-colored debris were een near the RSRB aft ET attach ring 
during liftoff (19:20:36.033 UTC), (Camera OTV060) . 
A Ingle piece of SRB flame duct debri (probably R S paper) wa een north of 
the launch vehicle during liftoff (19:20:48.255 UTC) , (Camera 5, L9 , E52) . 
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2.0 ummary of ignificant Event 
Figure 2.2 ( ) Debris Aft of Vertical Stabi lizer 
A single piece of debris fell aft of the vertical stabilizer during ascent 
(19:20:49 .550 UTC) , (Camera E222) . 
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2.0 Summary of ignificant Event 
Figure 2.2 (D) Debri ear SRB Exhau t Plume During scent 
Mul tiple pieces of debri (po sible SRB aft kin insta-foam) were seen fal ling 
along the SRB ex haust plume during ascent. The debri were een at 
19:20:50.433, 19:20:51.4, 19:20:53.2, 19:2 1:39.2, and 19:22:30.733 TC 
(Camera KTV4A, KTV 13, KTV2 1A, ET204, ET212, E224). 
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2.0 Summary of Significant Event 
Figure 2.2 (E) Debri Near ET Dome and RSRB 
Six relatively large piece of debris (probably umbilical purge barrier material) , 
first seen near the ET aft dome and the RSRB aft attach ring, fell between SRBs 
during ascent (19 :20:50.604 UTC), (Cameras E52, E54) . 
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2.0 Summary of Significant Event 
2.3 MOBILE LAUNCH PL TFORM (MLP) EVE T 
The SSME Mach diamond formation appeared to occur out of sequence as 
seen 0 11 Camera E76. 0 fo llo\ -up action wa ' req ue ' ted. The time of the 
Mach diamond formation are provided in Table 2.3 . 
SSME#3 19:20:28.764 UTC 
SSME#i 19:20:28 .962 UTC 
SSME#2 19:20:29.032 UTC 
Table 2.3 ( ) Mach Diamond Formation 
Figure 2.3 (A) Orange Vapor During SS Ignition 
Orange vapor, probably free burning hydrogen , was seen above the SSME rims 
and near the base of the vertical tabilizer during SSME ignition 
(19:20:26.9 UTC). Orange vapors have been een on previous missions 
(Can1era OTV070). 
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2.0 Summary of ignificant Event 
Figure 2.3 (B ) Holddown Po t M-7 B It Hang-Up 
A bolt hang-up wa een at the LSRB holddown po t M-7 at liftoff 
(19:20:32.611 UTC), (Camera Ell). An unidentified piece of debris fell past the 
HDP hoe at 19:20:32.601 UTe. SRB holddown bolt hang-ups have been een on 
ix of the la t eleven previou mi sion . See Table 2.3 (B). No follow-up action 
wa requested. 
MISSION LOCATION OF HANG-UP 
STS-34 RSRB holddown post M-2 
STS-33 RSRB holddown post M-3 
STS-39 RSRB holddown post M- l 
STS-43 LSRB holddown post M-7 
STS A5 RSRB hold down post MA 
STS-50 RSRB holddownpost M-4 
STSA6 LSRB holddown post M-7 
STS-53 RSRB holddown post M- l 
STS-73 RSRB holddown post M-2 
STS-75 LSRB hold down post M-5 
STS-76 LSRB holddown post M-5 
STS-78 LSRB holddown post M-S 
STS-79 RSRB holddown post M-3 
STS-83 LSRB holddown post M-7 
Table 2.3 (B) Table of HoJddown Post Bolt-Hang-up 
TPS ba e heat hield ero ion wa noted between the OM pod and the ba e of 
SSME #3 during SSME ignition (19:20:27 .659 UTC), ( amera E19) . 
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2.4 ASCENT EVENTS 
Atmospheric condensation was n arou nd the huttle Launch Vehicle during 
a cent (19:21:10 through 19:21 :20 UT ), (Cameras ET207, ET208 , ET212, 
ET213, E207, E2l2, E222, E223 , E224) . 
Linear optical effect were een along the launch vehicle between 19:2 1 :33.9 and 
19:21:38.5 UTC ( amera ET2l2, E212) . 
Figure 2.4 Recirculation at Aft End of Vehicle 
Recirculation, or the expansion of burning gasses at the aft end of the vehicle, was 
een during ascent (19:22:04.7 - 19:22:18.1 UTC). Recirculation during this time 
period bas been seen on previou mission (Cameras KTV13 , ET204, ET208 , 
ET2l2, E212) . 
A noticeable brightening was seen in the SRB exhau t plume just prior to SRB 
eparation (19 :22:30.967 to 19:22:34.033 UTC), (Cameras ET204, ET207) . 
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2.5 ONBO RD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE E TER L TA (DTO-312) 
2.5.1 naly i of the Umbilical Well Camera Film (Ta k #2) 
Two roll of STS -83 umbilical well camera film were acquired (DTO-312, 
Method 1) : the 16mm film (5mm len) and the 16mm fi lm (10mm len) from the 
LH2 umbilical. The 35mm camera film from the L02 umbilical did not run . The 
+X tran lation maneuver wa performed on TS -83. 
umerou light-colored piece of debri (i nsulation and frozen hydrogen) and dark 
debri (probably charred insul ation) were een throughoLlt the film equence. 
Typical ablation and charring of the ETIOrbiter LH2 umbilical electric cable tray 
and the aft Luface of the horizontal ection of the -Y ETISRB vertical strut wa 
een . blation and charring of the TP on the aft dome was les than u ual. The 
LSRB eparation appeared normal. 
Figure 2.5.1 (A) 10 eout Flange Di vots 
Four TP divots, approximately nine inche in ize, were een on the intertank-
to-LH2 tank flange clo eout on the -Y +Z axis (1). Three additional TPS divots (2) , 
approximately ix inche in ize, were een on the intertank-to-LH2 tank flange 
closeout between the bipod leg (2) . ( 1Omm len, frame 10753) . 
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igure 2.5. I (B) Blister on LH2 Umbilical ir Barrier 
Two larger-than-u ual areas of blistering were seen on th fire b,uTier on the 
outboard side of the LH2 umbilical (5mm lens , frame 5141). 
2.5.2 Analy j of Handheld Photography of the ET (Task #3) 
DTO-312 handheld photography (Method 4) of the STS-83 ET was acquired after 
ET eparation . A Nikon 35mm camera with a 400mm lens and a 2X extender was 
used. The OMS-2 attitude pitch maneuver wa performed early to a. sist the cr w 
member in acquiring the ET visually. 
Fifteen view of the external tank were acquired (ro ll 444) . he +Z, -Y axi of the 
ET wa imaged. The majority of the ET was in shadow and too dark for analysi . 
Timing data is present on the hand-held film. The fir t picture wa taken on April 
4, 1997 at 19:38:33 UTe (approximately 18 minute after lifloff) , and the last 
picture was taken at 19:40:54 UTe. 
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Figure 2.5.2 ET Separation Velocity 
The distance of the external tank was calculated on eight frames. On the first usable 
view, the external tank was calculated to be a distance of 3.1 km away from the 
Orbiter at 18:43 MET. On the last view, the tank was calculated to be at a distance 
of 3.4 km (1.5 minutes after the first view) . The tank separation average velocity 
was deteimined to be 3.5 meters/second (mls), with an uncertainty of approximately 
1 mls. The tank tumble rate was approximately 0.5 degrees/second and the roll rate 
was approximately 0.6 degrees/second. 
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2.6 LANDING EVENTS 
2.6.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #1) 
Film camera EL9 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear and 
ELI was used to determine the nose gear sink rate. The sink rates of the Orbiter 
were determined over a one-second time period prior to main and nose gear 
touchdown. 
The measured main gear sink rate values were found to be below the maximum 
allowable values of 9.6 fUsee for a 211,000 lb. vehicle and 6.0 fUsec for a 240,000 
lb. vehicle (the landing weight of the STS-83 Orbiter was reported to be 235,286 
lbs.). The sink rate measurements for STS-83 are given in Table 2.6.1. In Figure 
2.6.1 (A), and 2.6.1 (B), the trend of the measured data points for the image data is 
illustrated. 
Sink Rate Prior to Touchdown (1 Second) 
Main Gear 
Nose Gear 
1.5 ftfsee . 
4.0 fUsec. 
Table 2.6.1 Sink Rate Measurements 
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2.7 OTHER 
2.7.1 Normal Events: 
Other normal events observed included: ice and vapor from the ET/Orbiter 
umbilical areas during SSME ignition, elevon motion at SSME ignition, frost on 
the ET vent, ET twang, multiple pieces of light-colored debris falling from the 
LH2 and L02 TSM T -0 umbilicals prior to and following disconnect, MLP debris 
at liftoff, acoustic waves during liftoff, birds in view during liftoff, debris in the 
exhaust cloud after liftoff, vapor off SRB stiffener rings, outgassing of the ET aft 
dome, body flap motion, roll maneuver, ET aft dome charring, expansion waves, 
SRB separation, and slag debris after SRB separation. 
2.7.2 Pad Events: 
Hydrogen ignitor operation, FSS deluge water operation, MLP deluge water 
activation, GH2 vent arm retraction, TSM T-O umbilical operations, and sound 
suppression system water operation. 
Loose tape-like material was seen on the FSS during liftoff (Camera E54). 
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B 
Reply to Attn of: 
, 
.. 
• 
• 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812 
EP42 (97-25) 
TO: Distribution 
FROM: EP42fThomas J. Rieckhoff 
SUBJECT: Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for STS-83 
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-83, the twenty-second flight of the Orbiter Columbia 
occurred on 4/4/97, at approximately 1:20 P.M. Central Standard Time from launch complex 
39A (LC-39A), Kennedy Space Center, Florida Launch time was reported as 
97:094:19:20:32.019 Universal Coordinated Time by the Marshall Space Flight Center Flight 
Evaluation Team. Photographic and video coverage has been evaluated to determine proper 
operation of the flight hardware. 
The photographic coverage of the STS-83 launch was excellent due to the daylight and clear sky 
conditions. All cameras operated and recorded data except for the Orbiter L02 umbilical well 
camera which failed to operate. Camera Ell, which views holddown post M-7, provided a 
blurred image due to film motion during exposure. An automatic exposure control system was 
used for the mobile launch platform and flight support structure cameras. -
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) holddown post M-7 stud hung up at liftoff. The stud fell down into 
the catch mechanism once the vehicle had cleared the top of the stud. A dark debris piece of 
unknown origin was observed at the base of the stud near the top of the shoe during this event. 
The following events were observed on this mission and are not considered anomalous. These 
type events have been observed on previous missions: 
a) Loose thermal curtain tape on the right SRB at liftoff near holddown post M-4. 
b) The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) mach diamond formation was in the 
order of3-1-2. 
c) Frost around the eyelid of SSME#2 at liftoff. 
d) Paper debris fell aft during early ascent. 
e) Debris induced SSME plume streaks during ascent. 
£) Condensation collar formation around the vehicle during ascent. 
g) Flow recirculation around the external tank (ET) aft dome during ascent. 
h) Multiple TPS divots along the ET intertanklLH2 tank scarf joint from the left SRB 
attach point (-Y axis) to the forward bipod strut (+Z axis). 
B1 
The following event times were acquired: 
EVENT TIME (UTC) DATA SOURCE 
M-l PIC Firing 19:20:32.028 Camera E9 
M-2 PIC Firing 19:20:32.026 Camera E8 
M-5 PIC Firing 19:20:32.027 Camera E12 
M-6 PIC Firing 19:20:32.028 Camera E13 
SRB separation 19:22:35.12 Camera E207 
This report and additional information are available on the World Wide Web at URL: 
htlp:llphoto4.msfc.nasa.gov/STS/sts83/sts83.html. 
For further information concerning this report contact Tom Rieckhoff at 205-544-7677 or Jeff 
Hixson, Boeing North American at 205-971-3082. 
~lJII 
Thomas J. Riec ff 
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